A Franklin County appellate panel was not convinced by the appeal of a woman who faulted a trial court’s divorce decree and designation of her ex-husband as sole legal custodian of the couple’s two minor children.

Anna Messina asserted that the Franklin County Common Pleas Court, Division of Domestic Relations, abused its discretion in denying her motion to continue proceedings.

“The trial court thoroughly explained its reasons for denying appellant’s continuance motion,” Tenth District Judge David Leland wrote for the 3-0 panel. “It gave appellant opportunities aplenty to proceed to trial with legal representation, but instead she discharged her attorney immediately before trial.”

According to case background, David Messina filed a complaint for divorce and a shared parenting plan of the couple’s two minor children Jan. 11, 2023.

Anna Messina filed an answer and counterclaim for divorce on Feb. 8, 2023.

Later the same month, Columbus attorney Thomas Gjostein filed a notice of appearance on behalf of Anna Messina and substitution of counsel, indicating his client was replacing her prior legal counsel, Legal Aid of Southeast and Central Ohio, with Gjostein.

David Messina withdrew his motion for shared parenting on June 12, 2023, summary provided.

On Oct. 10, 2023, Hilliard attorney Donald Roberts filed a notice of appearance and substitution of counsel, indicating that he was replacing Anna Messina’s previous counsel.

The following month, the trial court set a trial date for April 30, 2024, summary continued.

On the first day of the scheduled trial, Roberts indicated that he was physically unable to proceed with representation of Anna Messina, and he requested a continuance, which the trial court granted.

The court, on May 13, 2024 — the same day Roberts was to undergo a medical procedure — set new trial dates of June 20 and 24, 2024.

A little more than a week later, Roberts filed a motion to withdraw as Anna Messina’s attorney, citing an extended physical recovery and a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship.

The court denied the motion to withdraw June 6, 2024, noting the impending trial date, a lack of action on an aging case and the possibility of deliberate delay, summary detailed.

The court indicated that even if the woman fired her counsel, it would not grant a continuance for her to seek new representation.

The attorney filed amended motions to withdraw on June 14 and 17, 2024, and indicated that Messina had fired him, summary continued.

On the first day of the trial, the court granted the attorney’s motion to withdraw, and when the woman asked for a continuance to allow her to hire new counsel, the court denied the motion, citing its previous holding prohibiting an additional continuance.

According to the summary, Messina repeatedly protested the decision while representing herself at trial.

At the conclusion of the trial, the court granted a divorce and designated David Messina the sole legal custodian and residential parent of the children.

Anna Messina subsequently appealed, asserting that the court abused its discretion when it granted her counsel’s request to withdraw and denied her request for a continuance.

“A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion to continue a trial date,” Leland wrote. “Our review weighs potential prejudice to the movant against the court’s right to control its docket and the public’s interest in the efficient dispatch of justice.”

The appellate panel reviewed the six factors that the trial court must consider in consideration of a motion to continue.

“First, the court explained that catching appellant’s new counsel up to speed would likely delay a resolution to this long-pending case. Second, the court noted it previously granted appellant a continuance and informed her it would not grant another. Third, the court emphasized a second continuance would inconvenience all persons involved in this litigation given the acrimony of these divorce proceedings, the preparations that had been made for the June 20 and 24, 2024 trial dates and the age of the case,” Leland wrote. “Fourth, the court recognized that securing new counsel is typically a legitimate reason to seek a continuance, but, in the context of appellant’s conduct in the present case, the court lacked confidence her request was made in good faith. Fifth, the court concluded appellant contributed to her need for a continuance by her decision to change legal counsel just before the start of trial. Sixth, the court stressed it had repeatedly informed appellant it would not grant another continuance for appellant to seek new counsel.”

The panel reasoned that any prejudice inflicted on the woman by the trial court’s denial could have been avoided.

“In the year and one-half it took this case to reach trial, appellant thrice retained then discharged her legal counsel,” Leland wrote. “Perhaps appellant had good reason for each firing, and if so, the court provided appellant ample time and opportunity to find adequate counsel. Without a doubt, the court did not pull the rug out from appellant.”

Tenth District judges Julia Dorrian and Kristin Boggs concurred with Leland’s opinion.